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6Summary and conclusions
In this thesis four firms in financial distress have been studied. The methods the Dutch
Bankruptcy System offers to firms to resolve their financial problems have been described,
and theories addressing the efficiency of rules and behavior of participants in firms in
financial distress have been discussed. These theoretical ideas have been contrasted with the
actual behavior of the participants with the four firms in financial distress. In this chapter the
answers to the research questions are reviewed and some suggestions for further research are
provided.
6.1 Review of objectives
ln chapter l, the objective of the study a.rrd the associated research questions have been
discussed. The research questions were the following:
i) How do Dutch hrms resolve hnancial distress?
2) Is the Dutch Bankruptcy System efficient, i.e., does this System not lead to the
economically unjustifiable dissolution of frms, and does it not lead to the economically
unjustifi able continuation of firms?
3) What public policy implications follow from a shrdy of firms resolving financial
distress?
To answer the first research question, the Dutch institutional structure and the methods to
resolve financial distress have been described. In chapter 3, the second research question has
been addressed by discussing incomplete contracting theory and the implied consequences for
bankruptcy law. This analysis has yielded hypotheses concerning the behavior of frm
participants. However, some of the hlpotheses conceming the efhciency of the Dutch
Bankruptcy System could not be disconfirmed. In order to disconf,rm the hypotheses one
would have needed to observe facts conceming the outcome of a strategy which the frrm, or
some of its participants, did not actually choose. Not one research design can solve this
problem; evidence can only be circumstantial. ln this study a case study research strategy has
been chosen to "test" the hypotheses. The argument has been put forward that in studying
actual behavior ofparticipants, one can analyze the influence ofrules on that behavior and in
this way provide evidence to support the efficiency of the Dutch bankruptcy rules. However,
the empirical findings do not support conclusions concerning the entire population of firms in
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financial distress. Nevertheless, from the empirical findings conclusions may be drawn
conceming theories about financial distress. Below, the discussion is summarized on the issue
of how the four firms studied in this book resolved financial distress and whv thev chose to
resolve their problems in the way they did.
6.1.1 How do firms resolve financial distress?
In studying the Dutch institutional structure pertaining to frms in financial distress, the term
Dutch Bankruptcy System has been introduced as a shorthand to indicate all the rules,
regulations and other institutions that determine or influence the process of hnancial distress
resolution. This discussion has led to an overview of the methods firms might use to resolve
their financial problems. The literature on the use of the methods - most of it is based on the
situation in the United States - and (dis)advantages associated with these methods have been
discussed. In the empirical part of this study the distress resolution activities of four Dutch
firms have been described. In the analysis of the cases in chapter 5 it has become clear that
they could not be considered "average" cases. For instance, the firm recovery rates were
much higher than the aggregate recovery rate as published by the Cenhal Bureau of Statistics
(section 5.2.3). The reasons why these frms became financially distressed were related to the
capital budgeting policy of the respective management teams and unique circumstances, such
as recession and managerial problems (section 5.2.1). To resolve these problems,
management and its consultants used different methods (section 5.2.2). With respect to these
uses, the empirical study into the resolution of hnancial distress has yielded the following
observations:
i) The private asset restructuring was not used very frequently, probably due to the size of
the firms studied (section 5.2.2).
ii) The private financial restructuring was used in varying degrees by the firms, depending
on the time available for (re)negotiations, the legal form of the firm, the attitude of
creditors towards a settlement, and the number of participants directly involved in the
negotiations (section 5.2.2).
iiD All four firms resolved their financial distress via an asset sale. The two incorporated
firms used the bankruptcy procedure to sell their respective assets. The fwo firms that
were not-incorporated sold their respective assets and also proposed a debt settlement,
either privately or in suspension, to their creditors. The debt settlement was necessary to
limit the liability of the respective owners and to obtain a price for the assets above
estimated liquidation values (section 5.2.2).
iv) In resolving hnancial distress, (top)management lost its position, but in three cases was
offered re-employment by the buyer on lower organizational levels. All four frms laid
off personnel in varying degrees. The larger, incorporated, firms laid off 12oh and 50%
of the employees, the smaller, not-incorporated, firms 33o/o and 90%. No information
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could be obtained to determine whether and on what conditions the laid off emplovees
might have found re-employment (section 5.2.3).
v) Resolving financial distress took a long period of time. Although the sale of assets
relieved the respective frms of their financial disfress within three quarters of a year,
the legal entity in which the activities of the firm originally had been organized,
remained financially distressed. The financial distress continued because the sorting out
and the ranking of ciaims of participants took a considerable amount of time (section
5.2.3) .
In settling the financial distress of these four hrms, high recovery rates were attained: from
36Yo to 100%. The proceeds of the sale of assets were tiistributed over the respective
creditors. In chapter 2 the absolute priority rule was discussed. This rule holds that junior
creditors should only receive monetary compensation when the senior creditors are paid in
full. In three cases secured creditors were paid the (estimated) value of their respective
collateral, before other creditors were paid. The contractual arrangement these creditors had
reached with the respective firms was respected in resolving financial distress. One may
conclude that absolute priority held on secured debt levels. However, absolute priority was
not respected on preferred and ordinary debt levels. Creditors with claims ranked as preferred,
ordinary or subordinated debt received partial payment on their claims. Only in one case did
the secured creditor have to accept a distribution of the proceeds that violated the absolute
priority rule on the secured debt level. Lastly, the total out-of-pocket costs in resolving
financial distress varied between 370 and l4%. These costs were related to the size of the firm
(section 5.2.3).
6.1.2 Efficiency of the Dutch Bankruptcy System
In chapter 3 the Dutch Bankruptcy System has been studied by using incomplete contracting
theory. The theory's main hlpothesis is that behavioral problems in firms in financial distress
are severe enough to warrant explicit rules that restrict individual rights. The behavioral
problems are common pool problems, collective action problems, and opportunistic use. The
problems of debt overhang and overinvestment arise, because collective action problems
exist. To eliminate, or mitigate these problems, incomplete contracting theory holds that
bankruptcy rules have to separate the decision on the usage of the assets of the firm from the
decision on the distribution of the value of the firm. Furthermore, rules should protect
creditors from being taken advantage ofin banlcruptcy, as a result ofthe opportunistic actions
of other participants. These theoretical considerations have been summarized in hypotheses
(section 3.8.1). With respect o these hypotheses, the empirical study into the resolution of
financial distress has yielded the following observations:
i) The out-of-pocket costs associated with the resolution offinancial distress for the four
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have been reported in other studies. Furthermore, the period in which the four firms
were actually financially distressed, was less than a year. Lastly, the four firms
illustrated that the Dutch Bankruptcy System mitigated common pool and collective
action problems (section 5.2.3, 5.3.1).
The empirical evidence showed that unsecured creditors were not able to
opportunistically appropriate value from inadequately protected secured creditors. The
potential problems were mitigated, because of the bargaining position of the secured
creditors. However, due to the fact that the behavior of participants in frnancially
distressed firms have been studied ex post, the observations permit no conclusions
concerning the consequences ofinadequate protection ex ante (section 5.3.2).
The possibility to use the bankruptcy procedure in order to lay off employees
selectively, was not the main determinant in explaining the choice to use the procedure.
Obviously the benefits ofthe procedure were taken into account in the choice of
method, but these were only one aspect of the decision about how to resolve distress
(section 5.3.3).
The conflicts over creditor rights on the compound bounded assets did not have material
effects in the four cases. The proceeds ofthe asset sales were sufficient to satisff the
claims participants had on these assets. Furthermore, the Tax Authority was cooperative
in completing the debt settlements of both not-incorporated firms (section 5.3.4).
The asset sale in bankruptcy made it possible to eliminate the consequences of the debt
overhang problem for the two incorporated firms. With the asset sale the decision about
what to do with the economically viable parts of the firm and the decision about how to
distribute the proceeds ofthe asset sale over the participants could be separated. The
separation of these two decisions was not possible for the rwo not-incorporated firms. In
these two cases the sale of assets did not relieve the respective owners of the two firms
of their financial problems. These financial problems were ultimately resolved by
settling the debts of the respective owners of the two firms either privately or by way of
a suspension composition. In these two cases the funds could be made available to offer
ordinary creditors a debt settlement. However, if a norincorporated firm is indebted to
such an extent that it cannot offer its ordinary creditors any payment, then the ultimate
consequence of debt overhang rnay be that a economically unjustihable dissolution
takes place ofthis firm (section 5.3.5).
No evidence could be found to support the hypothesis that the bankruptcy rules were
used by firm participants to opportunistically redistribute the value of the firm. Also no
evidence could be found to indicate that the trustee had to approve of bargain prices
when selling the assets of the firm (section 5.3.6).
Bankruptcy transferred the control ofthe firm to the trustee. This transfer ofcontrol
might have mitigated the opportunistic redistribution of value that can occur in
bankruptcy. However, the cases did not provide the evidence to conclude that this
Summary and conclusions
transfer of control was a necessary instrument in order to mitigate the consequences of
value redistributive actions, or in order to prevent these actions (section 5.3.7).
viii) No evidence was found in each of the four cases that a coalition of the shareholder and
the bank considered the inefficient continuation ofthe firm as a method to appropriate
value from other creditors. Furthermore, the behavior of banks in these cases pointed to
the opposite of coalition behavior: they terminated their relationship with the frm
(section 5.3.8). The cases did not provide enough data to discuss the hlpotheses
conceming the effect of differing liquidation values and bankruptcy costs on the
behavior of a coalition of the shareholder and the bank.
The evidence presented in this study supports the conclusion that, with some qualifications,
the Dutch Bankruptcy System did not induce to the economically unjustifiable dissolution of
frms and did not lead to the economically unjustifiable continuation of f,rrms. The Dutch
System mitigated the consequences of common pool and collective action problems, offered a
framework to resolve debt overhang problems, and mitigated, at least to some extent, the
consequences of overinvestment problems in financially distressed firms. Nevertheless, based
upon that same evidence the following three qualifications to this conclusion have to be
made:
i) debt overhang problems for not-incorporated firms might remain because of the
unlimited liability of owners of not-incorporated firms (section 5.3.5);
iD opportunistic actions towards secured creditors and employees might redistribute value,
possibly leading to less efficient contractual arrangements ex ante (section 5.3.6);
iiD conflicts over creditor rights concerning compound bounded assets, specifically the
right of the Tax Authority and Industrial Insurance Board versus creditors holding a
silent pledge, creditors retaining ownership and the ownership rights of lessors, might
impinge upon the resolution of frnancial distress (section 5.3.4).
6.2 Public policy recommendations
Above the conclusion has been drawn that the Dutch Bankruptcy System is, with
qualifications, efficient. Therefore, this study does not provide the basis for arguing that a
major revision of the System is necessary. {n chapter 5, section 5.4, some changes have been
suggested to the Dutch System that may enhance its efficiency. These changes concern the
procedure of resolving financial distress and the system of creditor rights.
The argument has been put forward that the Sweet and Plastics cases showed that debt
overhang problems played an important role in the way financial distress was resolved.
Ultimately, both firms were restructured and the consequences of debt overhang problems
were contained with, respectively, a private agreement and a suspension composition.
1 4 1
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Nevertheless, in other cases debt overhang problems may prove to be less easy to resolve.
Three ways of mitigating these problems have been reviewed:
i) Limiting the liability of owners of not-incorporated firms in financial distress. One way
of limiting this liability is to offer the debtor a fresh start. With a fresh start the debtor is
discharged ofall his debts, after all his assets are sold and the proceeds paid out to his
creditors. This discharge of debts eliminates the debt overhang problem. Another, less
extreme, altemative is to limit the time period in which the financially distressed debtor
is obliged to pay a part of his future iacome to his creditors. Although debt overhang
problems may be eliminated by limiting liability, this same limitation of liability may
provide financially distressed owners with the incentive to act opporfunistically in order
to wrest concessions ffom creditors. Therefore, the liability rules ultimately determine,
(i) the incentive to use suspension or bankruptcy opportunistically, and (ii) the extent to
which debt overhang stili affects the decision to whether or not the owner will engage in
economically productive activities (section 5.4. 1).
Adapting composition conditions. A bankruptcy composition procedure that mitigates
the consequences of debt overhang problems has to allocate voting rights only to tlose
creditors whose claims are not fully redeemed. However, such a procedure has very
serious drawbacks. Firstly, the owner of the firm has no incentive to petition for a
suspension of payrnent in order to restructure the firm. The procedure then offers the
owner the opportunily to be discharged of his debts independent of the extent of his
indebtedness. Secondly, a potential financier may excludejunior creditor classes from
the negotiations over a bankruptcy composition by supplying an amount of money
which leaves nothing for the junior creditors. Consequently, value redistribution may be
very large (section 5.4.2.1).
Forcing firms in suspension. The consequences of debt overhang problems for firms in
financial distress may also be mitigated when firms petition, or are forced to petition,
for a suspension of payment at the moment at which a suspension composition may still
be attained. However, defining the moment when firms should file is fraught with
problems. The difficulties associated with the valuation of the firm, the estimation of its
cash flows, and the distribution of information over firm participants, make it unlikely
that firms will file for suspension at a moment when the procedure may still be useful.
-l.he German experience with "Uberschuldung", a rule specifying that a firm with
liabilities exceeding assets has to apply for the German equivalent of suspension or
bankruptcy, made clear that the rule did not work in practice (5.4.2.2).
Of the changes discussed above, probably the most important one is the iimitation of liability
of owners of not-incorporated firms in financial distress. The consequence of such a
limitation is that owners may act opporfunistically towards creditors. Obviously, creditorc of
the firm will demand compensation, or security, for this risk. The empirical evidence
248
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presented in this study does not make it possible to estimate the balance of the benefits of
limiting liability and the compensation creditors demand to cover the costs associated with
the opportunistic actions of owners of not-incorporated firms (section 5.4.1).
Other changes to the Dutch Bankruptcy System that have been discussed aim at facilitating
the restructuring of the firm. The argument has been put forward that facilitating the
restructuring of the firm does not necessarily imply the restriction of creditors' rights more
than the present procedure does. The Dutch Bankruptcy System offers enough possibilities, at
least to incorporated firms, to restructure successfully. Consequently, a procedure that
facilitates the restructuring of the frm by restricting creditor rights more than the present
procedure allows, while offering certain (groups of) participants the possibilify to
opportunistically appropriate value from other creditors, is not needed (section 5.4.3).
Nevertheless, three changes in the Dutch System have been discussed that may improve upon
its use as a restructuring procedure. These are:
i) The trustee should maximize the value of the estate. Explicitly recognizing this aim
gives the trustee a clear assignment and identifies the participants for whom he is
expending effofi. However, the High Court has recently stated that a trustee should
consider other interests than only those ofthe creditors and the debtor in deciding on the
flrrms future. Related to the aim of maximizing value, the argument has been put
forward that the trend towards the specialization of lawyers into full time trustees
should be encouraged. Furthermore, the accountability ofall involved should be
enhanced (section 5.4.3. 1).
ii) The trustee should be provided with a valuation report on the hrm if participants in the
firm propose to use the method of a financial restructuring via the asset sale to resolve
financial distress. Although this duty to provide a valuation report is no guarantee that
these participants will bid the true value of the firm, at least it may mitigate the
incentive of participants to use t}le asset sale opportunistically (section 5.4.3.2).
iii) The inclusion of a financial restructuring rule in the Bankruptcy Act which respects
creditor rights. With this rule all obligations of the company are eliminated and
substituted for shares in the company, or options on these shares. Such a rule respects
the contractual rights of creditors, and eliminates the redistribution of value due to asset
underpricing. Although the rule may be theoreticaily sound, practical valuation
problems may diminish its effectiveness to such an extent that it may not be considered
an improvement on the present procedure (section 5.4.3.3).
The evidence presented in this snrdy does not allow the drawing of conclusions conceming
the necessary changes in the system of creditor rights. This inconclusiveness arises, because
the cases showed that conflicts over creditor rights, although present, did not obstruct the
process of resolving hnancial distress. Only the consequences of some of the features of the
Dresent
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system of creditor rights can be outlined. Based on the findings of this study this outline is the
following:
i) The elimination of conflicts over creditor rights conceming compound bounded assets
either implies the elimination of the rights of the Tax Authority and Industrial Insurance
Board, or the elimination of the rights of creditors secured with a pledge, the rights of
creditors retaining ownership and the rights of lessors (section 5.4.4.1).
ii) The elimhation of the opportunistic use of the procedure to lay off employees is
impossible if government aims to protect employees from labor market imperfections,
but also aims to give hnancially distressed firms the opportunity to reorganize. This
trade off may change in the course of time if, for example, labor markets become more
efficient and perfect (section 5.4.4.2).
iiD Secured creditors should be adequately compensated in bankruptcy at least during a
stay of creditors. This makes part of the cost of capital associated with the use of the
assets of the firm visible and forces participants to include this cost in their decision
making (section 5.4.4.3).
As a last remark, the argument has been put forward that bankruptcy will become one of the
tools of management o restructure the firm. Therefore, in designing bankruptcy rules or a
change in the system of creditor rights, utmost care must be taken to ensure that no incentives
are created to use bankruptcy opportunistically. The decision to petition for bankruptcy
should be taken if no other methods are available to resolve hnancial distress. Those frms
that do not have a profitable future should be dissolved quickly, those with a profitable future
should be offered a procedure which gives participants the opportunity to restructure the firm.
In arriving at the decision to restructure the firm, participants should include all costs of the
strategy they have chosen in their considerations. This will only happen if the contracts of the
various participants are respected in bankruptcy (section 5.4.4.4).
6.3 Suggestions for further research
This study is one of the first in the Netherlands to inquire how frms resolve their financial
problems and what role public and private contracts play in this process. A case study
research strategy has been employed to study this process. In designing this strategy, I have
tried to address and control the many potential problems associated with case study research.
The strategy has paid offi it has increased insight into the process of resolving distress and
insight into the efficiency of public and private rules. One avenue for further research would
be to enlarge the number of available case studies on financially distressed firms. I can think
of two ways in which enlarging the number of firms may prove beneficial to our
understanding: (i) studying larger firms with a more complex legal structure and a more
complex capital structure, and (ii) studying firms in which a coalition of a select group of
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participants has the possibilily to appropriate value from other creditors by continuing the
firm. The first enlargement may reveal whether the process of distress resolution becomes
more problematic when legal structure and capital structure compound the negotiations. This
complexity may obstruct the establishment of creditor rights, and may enlarge the possibilities
to opportunistically use the procedure. One important source of additional conflicts may be
information-asymmetries between insiders, quasi-insiders and outsiders. Studying the
behavior ofthese groups ofparticipants may reveal the strategies that are used by participants
to cope with problems caused by opportunistic behavior and information-asymmetries. Such a
study may also shed light on the question whether the problems in the bankruptcy of large
firms warrant a procedure, different from the smaller firms. The second enlargement follows
from the observation that in this study no evidence of coalitions, pondering the decision to
continue the frrm in order to appropriate value from other creditors, has been found. Studying
cases in which a forming of coalitions is more likely to occur, may provide additional insights
into the issue as to whether the Dutch rules are not only efficient with respect to the
restructuring of firms, but also to the dissolution of hrms.
In chapter 5, bankruptcy has been interpreted as a device that transfers control. This hansfer
of control is forced upon the participants by law, presumably because the participants could
not use the control rights associated with their claim themselves. However, this transfer of
control is a last resort method to restructure a firm's operating activities. With bankruptcy as
an ultimate method to control participants, it may be advantageous to adjust control rights in
such a way that participants still have ample opportunity to resolve financial distress
themselves. For instance, the cases provided some evidence that the consequences of the
capital investment policy, as this has been pursued by management, partly explained the
financial problems. The observation of the consequences ex post does not imply that
management, when faced with the decision to invest ex ante, actually and knowhgly
overinvested in the hrm. However, these findings suggest hat the control on the activities of a
firm may be lacking in some aspects. Another avenue for further research would then be to
take a step backwards from the brink of frnancial distress and study those firms in which the
control on the activities of the frm may be lacking. Such a study would shed light on the
issue of the content of residual control rights, which participants effectively exercise these
residual rights, and to what extent and in what dimensions residual control is bounded by the
other (financial) contracts.
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